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Abstract 
The classical theory of rational choice is built on several important internal consistency 
conditions.  In recent years, the reasonableness of those internal consistency conditions has 
been questioned and criticized, and several responses to accommodate such criticisms have 
been proposed in the literature.  This paper develops a general framework to accommodate the 
issues raised by the criticisms of classical rational choice theory, and examines the broad impact 
of these criticisms from both normative and positive points of view.   
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1.  Introduction 
The literature on the theory of choice and preference contains a large number of  “internal 
consistency conditions”, such as Chernoff’s condition (see Chernoff 1954), the weak axiom of 
revealed preference (see Samuelson 1938, 1947, 1948, and Arrow 1959), the strong axiom of 
revealed preference (see Houthakker 1950, and Arrow 1959), and the congruence axiom (see 
Richter 1966, 1971). Typically, these conditions take the following general form: if an agent 
chooses (or does not choose) certain options from sets ,... ,B A  of feasible options, then the agent 
will (or, alternatively, will not) choose certain options from sets ', ',... AB  of feasible options.
1   
The conditions play dual conceptual roles in the standard theory of choice.  First, they are treated 
as properties of rational choice, the (often implicit) claim being that, if the agent is “rational”, 
then her choices must satisfy these conditions.  Second, they are also treated as testable 
hypotheses regarding the agent’s choice behavior.   The focus of this paper is on the former 
interpretation though we also comment briefly on the latter interpretation. 
While the internal consistency conditions have been widely accepted as conditions that a 
rational agent should satisfy, from time to time examples have appeared in the literature to 
question that position.  The earliest examples that we know of are to be found in Luce and Raiffa 
(1957).  More recently, Sen (1993) has introduced some further examples in the same spirit and 
has argued that the reasonableness or intuitive appeal of these conditions cannot be judged 
without referring to the motives and objectives of the agent making choices.  The examples of 
Luce and Raiffa (1957) and Sen (1993) and other similar examples pose a challenge to the 
standard theory of rational choice.  In particular, they raise the following two questions.  First, is 
there a general reformulation of the conventional theory of rational choice that can 
accommodate examples of the type discussed by Luce and Raiffa and Sen?  Second, if at all one 
can find such a reformulation,  will it constitute a satisfactory response to Sen’s argument that 
                                                             
1 For example, the weak axiom of revealed preference, one of the most well-known of such conditions, says that, 
if, given a set of options that contains both   and    the agent chooses x and rejects y, then, given any other set  
that contains  , the agent does not choose  .  
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internal consistency conditions, by themselves, cannot constitute adequate intuitive criteria for 
assessing whether the agent’s choices are rational?   
The main purpose of this paper is to explore these two issues. We first develop a general 
framework, which is a reformulation of the conventional theory, to accommodate the examples 
of Luce and Raiffa and Sen and the like.  Next we argue that, though our reformulation of the 
conventional theory, as well as other less general reformulations
2 in the existing literature, can 
take care of the problem of internal inconsistency of choice in the examples under consideration,   
this does not in any way detract from Sen’s basic argument that the reasonableness of internal 
consistency conditions as conditions for rational choice cannot be judged without going into the 
agent’s motives and objectives.  
The plan of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2, we introduce some basic notation and 
definitions.  In Section 3, we present several examples and discuss their structural features.  In 
Section 4, we develop a general framework that can accommodate the examples discussed in 
Section 3.  In Section 5, we comment on several existing formulations that deal with issues raised 
by the examples showing violations of internal consistency conditions.  In Section 6, we provide 
an assessment of what we believe to be the central point of Sen’s analysis, namely, that the 
reasonableness of internal consistency conditions for choice cannot be decided without referring 
to the objectives and motives of the agent making the choices.  Section 7 contains brief remarks 
on our model and on some broader issues relating to the theory of rational choice.  
2.  The basic notation and definitions   
An agent is described by a triple <     >, where   is a given non-empty set of options, 
  is a non-empty class of non-empty subsets of  , and   is a function, which, for every      , 
specifies exactly one non-empty subset of  , to be denoted by           is to be interpreted as 
the different non-empty sets of feasible alternatives (menus or opportunity sets) with which the 
agent under consideration may be confronted, and, given a menu,        is to be interpreted 
as the set of options that the agent chooses from  .  We call   the choice function of the agent. 
                                                             
2 See Section 5 for a discussion of some of these reformulations. 5 
 
Definition 2.1. Consider an agent described by <     >. The choice function   satisfies: 
(i)  Chernoff’s condition iff , for all         and all        , if       and [         and 
             , then not[         ; 
(ii)   the weak axiom of revealed preference iff, for all         and all        , if  
[         and                then not[         and       ; 
(iii)   the congruence axiom iff there do not exist  a positive integer  , menus 
                  and               , such that, for all              , 
            and            and                  and                       ; 
(iv)  rationalizability in terms of an ordering iff there exists an ordering   , defined over  , 
such that, for all      ,                      -greatest elements in  . 
 
The properties introduced in Definition 2.1 are very familiar in the literature
3.  The first 
three of these properties, Chernoff’s condition, the weak axiom of revealed preference, and the 
congruence axiom are in ascending order of logical strength, and the congruence axiom is a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the choice function   to be rationalizable in terms of an 
ordering (see Richter 1966).  Chernoff’s condition, which requires that, if an option   is revealed 
to be strictly better than an option   in a set  , then, when the set   is enlarged to a set  ,   
cannot be revealed to be at least as good as   in the set  , is the weakest of the four properties 
and seems highly plausible.  As we shall, however, see in Examples 3.1 through 3.4 below, when 
choices are menu-dependent, this condition becomes immediately questionable.  The weak 
axiom of revealed preference requires that, whenever an option   is revealed to be better than   
an option   in a set  ,   cannot be revealed to be at least as good as   in another set  .  The 
congruence axiom says that if an option   is revealed to be at least as good as an option   
through possibly a chain of feasible sets, then   cannot be revealed to be better than   in any 
set. Rationalizability of   in terms of an ordering, which is logically equivalent to the 
congruence axiom for  , requires that the agent’s choices should be compatible with the 
standard notion of “preference optimization”, i.e., there should exist an ordering such that the 
                                                             
3 See Chernoff (1954) for Chernoff’s condition, Samuelson (1938, 1947) for the weak axiom of revealed preference, 
and Richter (1966) for the congruence axiom. 6 
 
set of options chosen by the agent from any given admissible menu would coincide with the set 
of best alternatives defined for that menu by that ordering.  
3.   Examples 
Example 3.1 (Sen 1993).  In a party, when the fruit tray comes to an individual, there are 
several pears and one apple in the tray.  He chooses a pear.  If, however, the tray had an 
additional apple, he would have chosen an apple.  The individual’s choices violate Chernoff’s 
condition.   The explanation lies in the fact that, when the tray contains only one apple, 
choosing it violates social norms (“a polite person does not pick up a fruit if it happens to be the 
single fruit of its type in the tray”). 
Example 3.2.  In a firm, there has been a long-standing rule that all customers’ queries 
must be responded to within a week. A given employee, say,  , of the firm, however, disposes 
of all such queries directed to him in 4 days.  A new manager comes in and introduces a rule 
saying that all customers’ queries must be dealt with in no more than 4 days.   After the rule is 
introduced,   responds to all queries in 2 days.   The choice behavior of the employee violates 
Chernoff’s condition.   A possible reason may be how   wants to be seen.  Given the rule that 
the job must be done in no more than   number of days,   does not want to be seen as 
someone who works at the margin of the rules by finishing the job exactly in   days.  At the 
same time, he does not want to jump up and finish the job immediately because, if he does so, 
he is likely to be seen as the “management’s poodle”.  So he settles for some safe point 
between the two extremes, namely,   days and 0 days, and, in the process, violates Chernoff’s 
condition.   
Note that, in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, in judging an option, the agent is using a criterion 
(possibly, with other criteria) that depends on the set of feasible alternatives from which the 
option is being chosen. In Example 3.1, the criterion of fulfilling social norms depends on 
whether the chosen fruit is the single fruit of its type in the feasible set.  In Example 3.2, the 
criterion is one of taking the safe “middle path” between the maximum possible days allowed 
by the manager to respond to customer queries and 0 days.  The “middle path” constitutes a 
menu-dependent evaluative criterion.  Examples similar to Example 3.2 can be found in 7 
 
empirical studies of consumers’ behavior (see, for example, Simonson 1989).  Examples 3.1 and 
3.2 illustrate what we shall call the agent’s menu-dependent criteria for judging options. 
Example 3.3 (Luce and Raiffa 1957).  The waiter in a restaurant gives a customer a menu 
for the day’s dishes, which has two items: steak and fish.  The customer orders fish.  The waiter 
subsequently reports that, because of a mistake, frog’s legs and fried snails have been omitted 
from the day’s menu but they are available.  The customer then orders steak.  Again, this is a 
violation of Chernoff’s condition.  The intuition is that the customer would choose steak rather 
than fish or fried snails or frog’s legs if he has some assurance that the restaurant is good (“an 
indifferent restaurant would not know how to handle steak”) and the customer’s experience 
tells him that fried snails and frog’s legs are served only by good restaurants. 
Example 3.4.   The following is a true story of a university professor.  The professor 
spent at least 4 hours each week to discuss with his two research students their academic 
problems.  Then the chair of his department imposed a rule, which required that each 
supervisor of doctoral dissertations must devote no less than one hour each week to each of his 
Ph. D. students.  After the rule was introduced, our professor devoted exactly one hour each 
week to discussions with each of his Ph. D. students.     The professor’s choices obviously 
violated Chernoff’s condition.  There can be several alternative explanations of the professor’s 
behavior.  But the one, which the professor himself gave, was the following: “if the university 
does not trust me to do a good job of supervising my students on my own, then I am going to 
follow exactly the rules introduced by the university.”  In this case, the feasible set for the 
professor acted as an indicator of the chair’s trust, and trust and reciprocation for trust were 
important considerations for the professor.  The professor’s behavior cannot be dismissed as 
the eccentric behavior “typical of academics”.  There seems to be some evidence that too many 
rules and regulations governing the behavior of workers on the shop floor may actually 
adversely affect the work that they put in. In a laboratory setting, Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt 
(2007) study the effects of two different contracts, “bonus contract” with less rules and relying 
on trust, and “incentive contract” with detailed rules regarding workers’ efforts and relying on 8 
 
verifications by a third party,  and find that bonus contracts can outperform incentive contracts 
in inducing workers’ effort. 
   In Examples 3.3 and 3.4, the menu from which the agent makes his choice gives him 
more information about the options. They constitute examples of what we shall call menu-
dependent information.
4 Note that, Examples 3.3 and 3.4 share one feature of Examples 3.1 and 
3.2.  In Examples 3.3 and 3.4, as in Examples 3.1 and 3.2, the agent has concerns that are not 
captured in the original descriptions of the options: the description “steak”, in itself, does not 
capture the quality of the steak with which the agent is concerned in Example 3.3; nor does the 
description, “spending   hours each week to discuss with the students” say anything about the 
chair’s trust in the professor--a criterion or concern of the agent in Example 3.4.  There is, 
however, one difference between Examples 3.1 and 3.2 on the one hand and Examples 3.3 and 
3.4 on the other.  Neither the criterion represented by the social norm of not picking up an only 
fruit of its type (see Example 3.1) nor the criterion of the “middle path” (see Example 3.2) can 
be articulated without referring to a menu.  In Example 3.3, however, the criterion of quality 
can, in principle, be articulated without any reference to the menu where “steak” figures; 
similarly, in Example 3.4, the criterion of appropriate reciprocation for trust also can be stated 
without any reference to the menu where the option “spending   hours each week to discuss 
with the student” figures.  Thus, the criteria under consideration in Examples 3.3 and 3.4 are 
definable without any reference to a menu; what seems to be menu-dependent in Example 3.3 
(resp. Example 3.4) is the agent’s (imperfect) information, at the time of choosing, about the 
fulfillment of the relevant criterion when he chooses the option “steak” (resp. the option 
“spending   hours each week to discuss with the students”)
5.    This difference provides the 
basis of our distinction between situations of “menu-dependent criteria” and situations of 
“menu-dependent information”.  
                                                             
4  In this paper, we focus on some conceptual issues that arise in the presence of menu-dependent criteria and 
menu-dependent information.  Similar issues, however, can arise even in the absence of menu-dependent criteria/ 
information when the agent’s choice from a given menu is influenced by the state of the world and the state of the 
world is not a part of the description of the options.  A consumer, who chooses cold salad over hot soup if the 
weather is very warm but chooses hot soup over cold salad if the weather is cold, manifests such “state-
dependence” (see Bandyopadhyay, Dasgupta, and Pattanaik 1999, 2004). 
5 As we explain in Section 4, in Examples 3.3 and 3.4 the agent can be seen as choosing in a situation of 
uncertainty. 9 
 
Examples 3.1 through 3.4 show that, in certain fairly plausible situations, the agent’s 
choice function can violate Chernoff’s condition, which constitutes one of the weakest of 
consistency conditions discussed in the literature.  Yet, in none of these examples, the agent 
acts in a way that one can reasonably call “irrational”.  The above examples show how 
reasonable agents may violate internal consistency conditions for choice.  More importantly, 
they all illustrate a broader methodological point, forcefully made by Sen, that the 
reasonableness of the internal consistency properties of choice cannot be determined without 
considering the criteria or motives behind the agent’s choices.  In Examples 3.1 and 3.2, as well 
as in Examples 3.3 and 3.4, the agent’s violation of Chernoff’s condition does not seem 
irrational at all once we know the reasons behind the agent’s choices.   The conclusion that Sen 
sought to draw from his examples was that it was not possible to formulate the theory of 
rational choice exclusively in terms of internal consistency of choices without going beyond 
choice as such to explore the criteria or motives guiding the agent’s choices. 
Examples 3.1 through 3.4 naturally raise the following issues. 
Issue 1.  Can the phenomena described in these examples be accommodated in the 
standard framework of revealed preference theory by plausibly reformulating the model so 
that the consistency conditions will not be violated in the reformulated model? 
Issue 2. If at all it is possible to reformulate the model so as to accommodate the 
phenomena described in the examples without any violation of internal consistency conditions 
in the reformulated model, then what are the implications of such reformulation for the basic 
methodological point raised by Sen, to wit, whether one can discuss the reasonableness of 
internal consistency conditions without going beyond the concept of choice to look into the 
objectives guiding the agent’s choices? 
Issue 3.  The problems raised by Examples 3.1 through 3.4 have been typically discussed 
in the context of the theory of revealed preference where one starts with the primitive notion 
of choice rather than with preferences of the agent.  Do similar problems arise in models where 
one starts with the primitive notion of preference?  10 
 
Issue 4.  Finally, what happens if we treat the consistency conditions for choice as 
empirically testable hypotheses rather than as normative conditions for the agent’s 
“rationality”? 
  In Section 4, we take up the first issue.  We show that it is indeed possible to adapt the 
basic model so that the agent’s behavior, when considered in the adapted version of the 
original model, will not violate the relevant internal consistency condition for choice.  In Section 
6, we take up the other three issues noted above. 
4.  A general framework to handle the phenomena of menu-dependent criteria and 
menu-dependent information  
   Faced with the violation of internal consistency conditions in situations involving menu-
dependent criteria, one of the typical responses of theorists has been to reformulate some or 
all the characterizing features (the universal set of alternatives, the set of potential menus, and 
the choice function)  of the agent in a way that gets rid of such violation.  In this section, we 
present a reformulation of the conventional theory to accommodate Examples 3.1 and 3.2 
discussed earlier.   Though, for the purpose of our discussion, we focus on the case of menu-
dependent criteria, at the end of this section we indicate how similar reformulations can deal 
with menu-dependent information (Examples 3.3 and 3.4). 
In Example 3.1, as well as in Example 3.2, the agent uses a menu-dependent criterion
6 to 
assess the options available in alternative menus.   Every such criterion refers to some features 
of the choice of a given alternative from a given menu.  The analytical strategy that we adopt is 
to introduce the notion of indistinguishability/distinguishability, in terms of the relevant 
features, between the choice of an option from one menu and the choice of the same option 
from another menu. 
Consider a case of menu-dependent criteria, where <     > is the “initial” description 
of the agent, and   violates some internal consistency condition, say, Chernoff’s condition.  For 
ease of presentation and without loss of generality, we assume that, for all   in  ,  there exists  
                                                             
6  In general, there may be more than one menu-dependent criterion.  Therefore, strictly speaking, outside the 
specific examples considered here it would be more appropriate to talk about “a set of menu-dependent criteria” 
rather than “a menu-dependent criterion”.  We would, however, use the two terms interchangeably.  11 
 
some       such that      .  For all      , let    be a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive 
binary relation defined over the set    , where    is defined as the set of all         pairs 
      such that          ; thus,    is an equivalence relation defined over    .  Our intended 
intuitive interpretation of                is that, in terms of the descriptive features referred 
to by the menu-dependent criteria (or, criterion) under consideration, choosing   from the set 
  is indistinguishable from choosing   from the set  .  Thus, for every            is  induced by 
the menu-dependent criteria under consideration. In Example 3.1, where the menu-dependent 
criterion is that of not choosing a fruit from a fruit tray if the fruit happens to be the only one of 
its type in the tray, if   is a particular apple that belongs to two different sets,   and  , of fruits, 
then              if and only if  either   is the only apple in   as well as in   or   is not the 
only apple in either   or B.  Note that, for distinct alternatives        ,  we have not 
introduced any notion of distinguishability or otherwise between choosing   from a set       
and choosing   from a set       (irrespective of whether or not   and   are identical) because 
we do not need this additional information for our purpose.  
It may be worth clarifying the intuitive content of the equivalence relations   ,   , etc.  
Our notion of equivalence relations such as   ,   , etc.,  is different from the concept of an 
ordering  over                  , that makes comparisons of the type “the choice of   from 
the menu   fulfills the menu-dependent criteria at least as much as the choice of   from the 
menu  .”  Not only is it true that our equivalence relations,    ,   , …, do not presuppose, 
either formally or intuitively,  any ordering over                  , but the intuitive 
interpretation that we have for these equivalence relations is also very different from the 
notion of fulfilling the menu-based criteria to the same extent.  Given the descriptive features 
relevant for the menu-dependent criteria, our notion of indistinguishability between (     and 
(     in    refers to indistinguishability in terms of those descriptive features rather than in 
terms of identical degrees of fulfillment of the menu-dependent criteria.  Indistinguishability in 
terms of the relevant descriptive features intuitively entails identical degrees of fulfillment of 
the menu-dependent criteria, but the converse is not necessarily true.  Note that, though we 
have chosen to interpret our equivalence relations as relations indicating indistinguishability in 
terms of the descriptive features relevant for the menu-dependent criteria and not as relations 12 
 
indicating identical degrees of fulfillment of the menu-dependent criteria, it may be noted that 
much of what we say below applies to both these interpretations.   
Let            be a given set of equivalence relations interpreted as above.  For all    
 , we say that     is trivial if and only if, for all        ,              implies         For all 
          , let        be the equivalence class of       defined by   , i.e.,        is the class 
of all           , such that             .  Clearly,        is a singleton if    is a trivial 
equivalence relation.  Note that, though formally one can consider any arbitrarily specified set, 
        , of equivalence relations, to make intuitive sense these equivalence relations need to 
be suitably interpreted in terms of the menu-dependent criteria under consideration. 
Having introduced the relevant equivalence relations          and the corresponding 
equivalence classes, we can now transform the initial description, <     >, of the agent in our 
example of menu-dependent criteria into a new description <         > specified as follows:  
                is the set of all ordered pairs            such that          ;                 (4.1) 
               is the class of all    such that for some      ,   ={                 ;  (4.2) 
               is a function, which, for every         , specifies the unique set                   
     ={                  ; and          .                 (4.3) 
 
It is clear that, given the set,          of equivalence relations, there exists a unique triple 
<        > satisfying (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3). Essentially, what is involved in the transition from 
the description of the agent in terms of <     > to the description in terms of <        > is 
the replacement of the original notion of an option by an “extended” notion of an option to 
capture an aspect that is relevant for the agent’s choices but does not figure in the original 
description of an option.  The concept of the class of potential menus, as well as the concept of 
options  chosen  from  a  menu,  is  then  adjusted  accordingly.  It  may  be  noted  that  the 
transformed  description  of  an  agent  by  <        >  depends  on  the  underlying  class  of 13 
 
equivalence relations         , which, in turn, are determined by the given menu-dependent  
criteria.   
How does our reformulated framework tackle the violation of Chernoff’s condition 
considered in Examples 3.1 and 3.2?  To answer this question, we first note the following result.  
Its proof can be found in the appendix. 
Proposition 4.1.  Let <     > be any given initial description of the agent and let  
         be a given class of equivalence relations.  Let <        > be the modified description 
of the agent satisfying (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3).    
(i)   If   satisfies any of the properties (Chernoff’s condition, the weak axiom of 
revealed preference, the congruence axiom, and rationalizability in terms of an 
ordering) introduced in Definition 2.1, then    must satisfy the same condition.  
(ii)   If, for all         is trivial, then    must satisfy all the properties (Chernoff’s 
condition, the weak axiom of revealed preference, the congruence axiom, and 
rationalizability in terms of an ordering) introduced in Definition 2.1 
(iii)   It is possible for     to satisfy all the properties introduced in Definition 2.1 even 
when, for all          is non-trivial and   violates Chernoff’s condition, the 
weakest of the properties introduced in Definition 2.1.   
Propositions 4.1 (i) and 4.1 (iii) show that the requirement of any of the four properties, 
namely, Chernoff’s condition, the weak axiom of revealed preference, the congruence axiom, 
and rationalizability in terms of an ordering, for the choice function    figuring in the new 
description <        > is weaker than the requirement of the same property for the choice 
function   figuring in the initial description <     >. Therefore, when    satisfies, say, 
Chernoff’s condition but   does not, we can say that, though the agent, described by  
<     >, violates Chernoff’s condition, the violation is really due to the fact that he regards 
the choice of an option   from some feasible set   to be distinguishable from the choice of the 
same option   from some subset   of  , and when the problem is re-formulated to take into 
account such “distinguishibility” of acts of choosing in addition to the features of the initial 
options, the violation of Chernoff’s condition disappears in the re-formulated choice problem.  14 
 
Proposition 4.1 (ii) shows that when all the equivalence relations in         are trivial,    must 
satisfy all our rationality conditions irrespective of whether   satisfies any of the rationality 
property.  Proposition 4.1 (ii), therefore, shows that, if, instead of being determined by 
exogenously given menu-dependent criteria, the equivalence relations can be specified in any 
way one likes, then one can always specify the equivalence relations in such a way that, when 
the model of the agent’s choices is reformulated with reference to such specification, the 
agent’s choice function in the reformulated model will necessarily satisfy all our rationality 
conditions.   
Having reformulated the initial description, <     >, of the agent so as to derive the 
new description, <        >, which satisfies (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), we can now define a 
modified notion of rationalizability of the initial choice function   in terms of an ordering.  The 
choice function   is said to satisfy <        >-based rationalizability in terms of an ordering iff 
  is rationalizable in terms of an ordering.   
The following proposition follows immediately from the definition of <        >-based 
rationalizability in terms of an ordering and the fact that, for every choice function, the 
congruence axiom is equivalent to rationalizability of that choice function in terms of an 
ordering (see Richter 1966).   
Proposition 4.2.  Let <     > be the initial description of the agent, and let   
<        > be the modified description satisfying (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3).    satisfies 
 <        > -based rationalizability in terms of an ordering iff    satisfies the congruence 
axiom.  
It may be noted that, when, for all       and all                                  
<        > -based rationalizability of   in terms of an ordering becomes equivalent to the 
standard rationalizability of   in terms of an ordering.  On the other hand, by Proposition 4.1 
(ii), when, for all      ,     is trivial, any choice function C  satisfies <        >-based 15 
 
rationalizability in terms of an ordering.
7  Given this observation, it is clear that every choice 
function   satisfies <        > -based rationalizability in terms of an ordering for some class of 
equivalence relations          .  This, by itself, is, however, of little intuitive interest unless the 
equivalence class           underlying the <        > -based rationalizability of   is ‘induced” 
by some intuitively plausible menu-dependent criteria. Before concluding this section, we 
indicate briefly how the case of menu-dependent information can be handled by a variant of 
the modeling strategy discussed above.  For convenience in exposition, we concentrate on 
Example 3.3.  Here the choice of a dish can be intuitively thought of as being associated with an 
uncertain prospect; for some dishes, the uncertain prospects may be trivial (i.e., they may really 
be certain prospects), but for others, such as steak, the uncertain prospect is non-trivial.  The 
uncertainty involved may be probabilistic (for example, the uncertain prospect may be a lottery 
with probability   for getting high quality steak and probability       for getting low quality 
steak) or non-probabilistic.  The important point is that the uncertain prospect, however 
conceived, that is associated with the choice of a dish, such as steak, can change, depending on 
the menu from which the option is chosen.  Thus, assuming for the moment that the 
uncertainty involved is probabilistic, the agent’s (subjective) probability for high quality steak 
can go up when he learns that the menu also includes frogs’ legs and fried snail.   Given this, for 
all        we can now introduce an equivalence relation    over    with the following 
interpretation:              means that the uncertain prospect that the agent associates 
with   when the menu is   is the same as the uncertain prospect that the agent associates with 
  when the menu is     We can then suitably transform the original description of the agent 
into a new description, where the equivalence classes,                etc., constitute the re-
specified options (one can think of a different  interpretation of   , under which the 
specification of the new options as                       , etc., would make sense, but we 
find the interpretation of    given above more direct and natural).    
 
            
                                                             
7  We are grateful to a referee for this observation. 16 
 
5.  Some alternative reformulations 
As we mentioned earlier, faced with the violation of internal consistency conditions in 
situations involving menu-dependent criteria, a typical response of theorists is to reformulate 
some or all the characterizing features, including the universal set of alternatives, the set of 
potential menus, and the choice function, of the agent in such a way that, such violation no 
longer occurs in the new formulation.   In what follows, we consider a few alternative strategies 
for such reformulation to be found in the existing literature. 
8     
5.1. Re-specification of the set of potential menus 
  In an interesting paper, Bossert and Suzumura (2009a) present a formulation that re-
constructs the set of potential menus.  They start with Example 3.1 due to Sen, where the 
“anomalous” choice behavior of the agent arises from the agent’s concern about a menu-
dependent criterion.  Following the terminology of Sen (1993), Bossert and Suzumura call such 
menu-dependent criteria “external norms” and suggest a formal device through which external 
norms can be incorporated in the model.
9   
Without going into the details of Bossert and Suzumura’s analysis, we outline here the 
intuition underlying their framework with specific reference to Example 3.1.  In Example 3.1, 
the violation of Chernoff’s condition occurs in a framework where the agent   is described by 
<     >, such that the universal set of options,  , is the set of all possible fruits, and the class 
of potential menus,   , is the class of alternative sets of fruits that the agent may have to 
choose from.  The menu-dependent criterion or external norm involved in Example 3.1 happens 
to be the social norm that forbids the agent to choose a fruit if it is the only fruit of its type in 
the menu.  Essentially, the analysis of Bossert and Suzumura can be interpreted as a 
transformation of the original description, <     >, of the agent  into another description 
where the universal set of options continues to be  , but the set of potential menus and the 
                                                             
8 We focus on responses that are based on various notions of rationalizability in terms of a single ordering.  See 
Kalai, Rubinstein and Spiegler (2002) for a response based on rationalizability by multiple orderings.   
9 In a related paper, Bossert and Suzumura (2009b) discuss a framework developed in Bossert (2001) dealing with 
issues raised by Examples 3.3 and 3.4.  The essence of this framework is to re-specify the options as uncertain 
prospects in a setting of non-probabilistic uncertainty and then to reconstruct the menus in terms of the newly 
specified options.  Given such re-specified options and menus, the violation of Chernoff’s condition disappears.   17 
 
choice function are re-specified.  The main components of their analysis can be described as 
follows
10. 
(i)  First, the external norms are formally introduced as a function,  , which, for every 
     , specifies exactly one (possibly empty) subset      of  ,      being interpreted as the 
set of options in  , which the external norms forbid the agent to choose from  . It is assumed 
that, for all      ,          is non-empty.   
            (ii) Next, one identifies a triple <        >, such that 
                = ;                                  (5.1) 
                    is the set of all non-empty subsets    of   , such that, for some         =    
                                            (5.2) 
and 
                   is a function, which, for every        , specifies a non-empty subset   (    of   ,   
                 such that              ;                (5.3) 
 
It can be checked that a triple <        > satisfying (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) will exist if and only if 
the following two conditions, (5.4) and (5.5), hold: 
    for all                                                                                                              (5.4) 
                for all         , if                         , then                 (5.5)  
Further, it can also be checked that there cannot exist more than one triple <        > 
satisfying (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3). 
(iii) Finally, one introduces the notion of “norm-conditional” consistency: for every 
consistency condition  , one says that the choice function   figuring in the original description , 
<     >, of the agent satisfies   subject to the constraints imposed by the menu-dependent 
criteria or external norms represented by   if and only if there exists a triple  <        > 
satisfying (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3), such that    satisfies  . 
          
                                                             
10  Though we have not strictly adhered to the notation and terminology of Bossert and Suzumura, we believe that, 
in the following account, we have not departed from their basic intuition 18 
 
Thus, intuitively, one constructs another description of the agent, such that, for every possible 
menu   in the initial description, the set of options that the agent chooses from   in the initial 
description is the set of options that the agent chooses from the menu            in the new 
description.  If the choice function in the original description violates the internal consistency 
condition  , but the choice function in the new description satisfies   , we can say that, though 
the agent  described by <     > , may be violating  , the violation is due to the fact that, given 
a menu, he treats the options forbidden by the external norms as “inadmissible for choice under 
the external norms”, and, that when the menus are re-specified to take into account such norm-
based inadmissibility in addition to physical infeasibility, the violation of   disappears in the re-
specified choice problem.    
  It may be noted the framework proposed by Bossert and Suzumura (2009a) is a special 
case of our general framework in the following sense.  Suppose we have an initial description, 
<     >, of the agent and a menu-dependent criterion or external norm represented by a 
function   as as described earlier.  Suppose, for every           is an equivalence relation 
defined over   , such that, for all                  ,               iff  either    
                        or                  .   Then, 
for every internal consistency condition    if   satisfies    subject to the constraints 
imposed by the menu-dependent criterion represented by  , then there must exist a triple 
<         > satisfying (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), such that     satisfies  ;    (5.6) 
and 
the converse of (5.6) is not necessarily true.         (5.7) 
The proof of (5.6) is straightforward.  To see that (5.7) is true, an example will suffice. In the 
spirit of Sen’s example involving the choice of a fruit in a party, let the initial description, 
<     >, of the agent be such that   =    ,            , where     and    are two apples,    
and    are two pears, and   is a mango;  =            where        ,           
                           and        ,        and            ,                    
                         Let the menu-dependent criterion be the norm of not choosing from 19 
 
a set of fruits the last fruit of its type, so that            ,                               
   .  Let   be Chernoff’s condition.  It is clear that, by definition,   cannot satisfy Chernoff’s 
condition subject to the constraints imposed by external norm represented by   since, given 
[             and              , (5.4) is violated and, hence, no triple <        > can 
possibly satisfy (5.1), (5.2), and (5.3) simultaneously.  It is, however, easy to check that there 
exists a triple <         > satisfying (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3), such that     satisfies Chernoff’s 
condition. 
5.2. Re-specification of options to make the menu a part of the description of an 
option 
 Another way of handling the phenomenon of menu-dependent criteria and menu-
dependent information may be to redefine the options so as to make the menu itself a part of 
the description of the newly defined options or alternatives
11.  For example, in Example 3.1, 
one can redefine the options so that the newly defined option is the act of choosing a particular 
fruit from a given fruit tray.  Once this is done, the options are “choosing an apple from a fruit 
tray that has one apple and ten pears”, “choosing an apple from a fruit tray that has ten pears 
and two apples”, and so on.  Thus, if the original description of the agent is  <     >, the 
respecified description will be  <        >, where  
   is the set of all       such that       and      ; 
   is the class of all non-empty subsets    of     such that, for some      ,         
   ; and 
   is a choice function, such that, for every         ,       =          , where   is 
the element of   such that             . 
It can be checked that, in this reformulation, of the original description of the agent, the 
choice function    cannot possibly violate any of the consistency conditions introduced in 
                                                             
11  One of us vaguely recalls having read a long time ago an interesting unpublished paper of the late Stig Kanger 
that discussed such a reformulation of the problem.  We have not been able to locate the paper to check the 
details.  See also Suzumura and Xu (2001) for defining an option in a similar fashion.      20 
 
Definition 2.1.  In the case of Cheronff’s condition, this is obvious because there do not exist 
distinct   ,        such that    is a subset of   .     also cannot violate the weak axiom of 
revealed preference or the congruence axiom or rationalizability in terms of an ordering, 
though the reason here is a little less obvious than the reason in the case of Chernoff’s 
condition. Thus, if we follow this method of transforming the original description of the agent, 
then we will eliminate the problem of the violation of the internal consistency condition, but 
then the conditions will cease to be of interest in the reformulated version since their violation 
will become a logical impossibility.  The formulation discussed in this subsection can be seen to 
be, formally, a special case of our general formulation of Section 4, when for all      , we 
define     in the following way:  for all distinct          such that       and      , 
             and not [            ]. 
 
5.3.  Re-specification of the notion of rationalizability of a choice function 
Another possible response to the examples by Luce and Raiffa, and Sen is to retain the 
original choice problem but to use different notions of rationalizability to accommodate the 
behavior illustrated by the examples.  An early contribution that modifies the standard notion 
of rationalizability to accommodate Sen’s example is by Baigent and Gaertner (1996).  In their 
approach, they develop a notion of rationalizability according to which there exists an ordering 
  over the universal set of options, such that, if there are several     greatest elements in a 
given menu, then the choice set  for the given menu is given by  the set of all    greatest 
elements in the menu, and if there is exactly one     greatest element in the menu, then the 
choice set is given by the set of all    greatest elements in the set of options that is left after 
excluding from the given menu the unique    greatest element there. In their approach, the 
external reference /motivation/social norm is taken into account in the formulation explicitly.  
As a consequence, the framework developed by Baigent and Gaertner (1996) is specific to the 
example due to Sen (1993).  In a latter contribution along the line of retaining the original 
choice problem but with a different notion of rationalizability, Gaertner and Xu (1999a) 
consider the choice of the median option(s) according to a linear ordering over the universal 21 
 
set.  Gaertner and Xu (1997, 1999b), Baigent (2007) and Xu (2007) consider variants of different 
notions of (non-standard) rationalizability introduced in Baigent and Gaertner (1996), and 
Gaertner and Xu (1999a) for the original choice problem.  Again, these non-standard notions of 
rationalizability are specific to particular choice behaviors as the axiomatic structures in their 
framework are designed to handle the respective choice behaviors.  In a related contribution, 
Gaertner and Xu (2004) develop a notion of rationalizability of choice functions based on the 
idea that, sometimes, the agent may refuse to choose any option even if this is the only option 
available.  Thus, in their framework, the choice set of a non-empty feasible set can be empty.  
This emptiness of the choice set is due to the agent’s concern about the procedure of bringing 
out the feasible set under consideration: from the agent’s perspective, the procedure that 
brought about the feasible set is so “undesirable” that only a show of protest in the form of the 
refusal to choose any option from the feasible set is justifiable.  For example, when there are 
several newspapers available in a country, an agent is observed to choose the one that is 
published by the government (the official newspaper); however, when the government bans all 
other newspapers except the official one and the other which is fairly pro government, the 
agent is observed to choose not to read any newspaper.  The agent’s behavior clearly violates 
Chernoff’s condition, and yet is quite reasonable under the circumstances.       
The above notions of non-standard rationalizability of choice functions can be reframed 
under the formulation presented in Section 4 so that they all become special cases of 
<        > -based rationalizability for suitable choice problems with properly chosen 
equivalence relations.  For example, for the choice of the median, one can introduce the notion 
of indistinguishability as follows:       is indistinguishable from       if and only if, according 
to some criteria, the agent regards     as the median element  of each of the two sets,   and         
 
6.  A reassessment of Sen’s argument 
        In Section 4, we have developed a rather general framework in which the choice problems 
are reformulated to encompass issues relating to menu-based criteria without making many of 
the assumptions that are typically made in the existing approaches discussed in Section 5.   
What, however, is the relevance of our reconstruction in Section 4, as well as the 22 
 
reconstructions discussed in Section 5, for Sen’s criticism of the interpretation of internal 
consistency conditions as rationality properties that can stand on their own without any 
reference to the objectives of the agent under consideration? We now take up this issue and 
we reach a conclusion very different from that often reached in the existing literature.  
  It seems to us that, while our reformulation of the type of choice problems illustrated in 
Examples 3.1 through 3.4 as well as other reformulations including that of Bossert and 
Suzumura (2009a, b) are of interest, they do not address the central problem that Sen raised; 
nor do they reduce in any way the impact of Sen’s criticism of the status the internal 
consistency conditions have sometimes been accorded in the literature on the theory of 
revealed preference.  To see this, consider again the contention of Sen in this context.   For 
convenience, we concentrate on Example 3.1, though the discussion can be readily extended to 
all the other examples in Section 3.   At the risk of being over-elaborate, let us spell out 
explicitly the different strands of Sen’s reasoning. 
   Let   <     > be the initial description of the agent, where the universal set of options, 
 , is simply the set of all possible fruits.  Sen’s argument then seems to proceed in three 
distinct steps.  The first step consists of the observation that, when we characterize the agent in 
terms of <     >, the agent’s choice function   violates Chernoff’s condition.  The second 
step consists of the observation that, when we know that, not only does the agent care about 
the fruit that he eats, but he also cares about the social norms under consideration, his choice 
behavior with respect to fruits does not seem irrational or bizarre at all.  The third step consists 
of the conclusion that Sen draws from the two observations.  The conclusion is that the appeal 
of Chernoff’s condition as a property of rational choice in the choice problem described  by 
<     > depends on our information about the objectives or motives of the agent:  if we are 
not aware that, not only does the agent care about what fruit he eats, but he also cares about 
conforming to certain social norms about the choice of fruits in a party, then, given the 
information that we have,  the violation of Chernoff’s  condition would seem to us  to be an 
indication of  “irrational” choice; on the other hand, if we know that the agent cares about the 
social norms under consideration in addition to caring about what fruit he eats,  then the agent 23 
 
would seem reasonable to us  despite the observed violation of Chernoff’s condition by the 
choice function  .   
  Now consider what our analysis in Section 4 above shows.  What it shows is that, if the 
theorist modeling the agent’s choice behavior knows that the agent cares about the social 
norm, in addition to caring about what fruit he  (i.e. the agent) eats, then the theorist can 
plausibly transform the description given by <     > into another description <     ,   > 
where    satisfies Chernoff’s condition.  While this is of interest, does it intuitively contradict in 
any way Sen’s conclusion?  We do not think so.  Indeed, it seems to us that our analysis only 
serves to reinforce the point that Sen is making.  It is true that, if the theorist knows about the 
agent’s concern about social norms, he can plausibly transform the original description of the 
agent so as to get rid of the problem of violation of Chernoff’s condition in the reformulated 
description.  But such a plausible formal transformation of the original description will be 
possible only if the theorist knows that the agent cares about certain social norms and also 
knows what these norms are (this latter piece of information is necessary for the theorist to 
decide whether the choice of an option    from a set   is, in terms of the social norms the agent 
cares about, distinguishable from the choice of   from another set  ).  The decision between 
the alternative formulations, <     > and <     ,   >, itself will depend on the theorist’s 
information and beliefs about the objectives or motivations of the agent.   If we do not know 
anything about the relevance of social norms for the situation described in Example 3.1, then 
there is no way of formulating the choice problem in terms of <     ,   >. Then we would 
presumably formulate the choice problem in terms <     >, and, in that case, the agent’s 
behavior would seem to violate Chernoff’s condition.  What Sen’s analysis emphasizes is the 
importance of our information about the agent’s concerns in assessing the intuitive appeal of 
internal consistency condition as criteria for “rational choice” in any given model of choice.  
What our analysis demonstrates is that, given suitable information about the agent’s concerns, 
it may be possible to reformulate the choice problem plausibly in such a way that an internal 
consistency condition will be satisfied in the reformulated version though it was violated in the 
original formulation.  But, of course, the very possibility of such reformulation will depend on 
our information and/ or belief about the agent’s concerns.  The issue can be stated slightly 24 
 
differently.  One can distinguish between two distinct aspects of the intuitive notion of 
rationality.  The first is the rationality of an agent’s goals (goal rationality).  For example, it is 
possible to argue that the agent has irrational goals if, other things remaining the same, the 
agent would choose to torture more of the animals around him.   In general, positive economics 
has scrupulously avoided the issue of goal rationality.  It has exclusively focused on what may 
be called structural rationality, i.e., the issue of whether the choices that the agent makes are 
coherent given the goals that the agent has.  It is this notion of coherence of choice, given the 
goals of the agent that the internal consistency conditions are intended to capture.  What Sen’s  
argument shows is that, even when we identify the notion of rational choice with this limited 
notion of structural rationality or coherence of choices given whatever goals the agent may 
have,  what constitutes coherent choice given one set of goals may not be coherent for a 
different set of goals.   Therefore, whether or not the agent is being coherent in his choices 
would depend crucially on our intuition about what constitute the goals of the agent.   Where 
do the agent’s goals enter into our formal models of an agent’s choices?  Note that before we 
can even formally define the internal consistency conditions, we have to describe the choice 
situation, namely the universal set of options, the class of opportunity sets that the agents may 
choose from, and the notion of the agent’s choice function.  The very first step here is, of 
course, to specify the universal set of options which embodies our conception of the type of 
objects that the agent is really concerned with
12.   If the universal set of options is specified as 
eating a mango, eating an apple, …. , then implicitly we are taking the view that the agent is 
concerned only with what fruit he eats.  If in a model of choice specified in this fashion, the 
agent’s choices violate Chernoff’s condition, then it may be because the options as we have 
specified them (in the course of specifying the universal set which reflects the goals of the 
agent) completely and correctly capture what the agent cares about, but the choices of the 
agent are incoherent given the agent’s concerns and goals, or it may be because we have 
specified the options in a way that does not reflect the concerns of the agent  appropriately.   
Therefore, even when we limit ourselves, as we typically do in positive economics, to the notion 
of structural rationality as the only conception of rationality, whether the choice behavior of an 
                                                             
12 Cf. Dasgupta, Kumar, and Pattanaik (2000). 25 
 
agent is structurally irrational (i.e., incoherent, given the agent’s goals) cannot be decided 
independently of what we consider to be the goals or objectives of the agent.  It seems to us 
that Sen’s criticism of the view of internal consistency conditions as properties of rational 
choice that can stand on their own without any reference to the agent’s concerns is valid in a 
fundamental sense and no formal reconstruction of the agent’s description detracts from its 
impact in any way.  Thus, our assessment of Sen’s arguments regarding the status of internal 
consistency conditions as properties of rational choice is very different from that of  Bossert 
and Suzumura (2009a) who, after demonstrating that some of Sen’s examples can be 
accommodated in their modified version of the conventional framework
13, conclude that their 
analysis “builds a bridge between rationalizability theory and Sen’s criticism” and that what 
emerges from their analysis is “the possibility of a peaceful coexistence of a norm-conditional 
rationalizability theory and Sen’s elaborate criticism against the internal consistency of choice.” 
  We would like to clarify three other related points.  First, note that so far we have taken 
a normative interpretation of the internal consistency conditions by treating them as conditions 
that a rational individual’s choice behavior will satisfy.  Sen focused on this interpretation which 
is often adopted in the literature.  What if we treat the internal consistency conditions as 
testable empirical hypotheses regarding an agent’s choice behaviour?  It is easy to see that the 
problem to which Sen drew our attention in the context of the normative interpretation of 
internal consistency conditions arises again, though in a somewhat different form, when we 
treat those conditions as empirically testable hypotheses.  We can introduce the internal 
consistency conditions only after we specify the universal set of options, i.e., only after we 
commit ourselves to a particular view of the alternatives that the agent chooses.   If, given a 
particular specification of the choice problem, the choice function of the agent turns out to 
violate some internal consistency condition, say Chernoff’s condition, then such violation 
falsifies the conjunction of two hypotheses.  The first hypothesis is that our specification of the 
universal set of options correctly embodies what the agent is concerned with in making his 
choices and the second hypothesis is that the agent’s choice function satisfies Chernoff’s 
                                                             
13 To be more specific, Bossert and Suzumura (2009a) are concerned with the conventional framework of the 
theory of revealed preference. 26 
 
condition when the options are specified in a way that correctly captures the agent’s goals.  
Given the falsification of the conjunction of these two hypotheses (i.e., given that the choice 
function figuring in a given description of the agent violates Chernoff’s condition), we cannot 
decide whether to reject the second hypothesis without committing ourselves to a position 
about whether or not the options, as we have specified them in our formal model, capture the 
objectives of the agent. 
14   
  The second point is this.  Sen’s original argument was formulated with reference to the 
theory of revealed preference where we start with the primitive concept of choice rather than 
preference.  What happens if we start with the primitive notion of preference and formulate, as 
usual, the notion of structural rationality in terms of the requirement that the agent’s 
preferences be an ordering, that is, the requirements that the agent’s preferences satisfy 
reflexivity, connectedness, and transitivity?  It is easy to see that this would make little 
difference to the validity or impact of the basic point of Sen.  Again, before we can even 
introduce the notion of the agent’s preferences, we need to specify the universal set of options 
over which the preferences are to be defined.  If the preferences violate, say, transitivity
15, then 
again we have to face the problem of deciding whether, given our chosen formulation of the 
choice problem, the requirement of transitivity has much appeal  in light of what we know 
about the agent’s goals.  
Finally, we consider a point that sometimes comes up in the context of Sen’s critique of 
the treatment of internal consistency conditions as conditions for rational choice.  It is 
sometimes argued that: (1) the theory of revealed preference and the associated internal 
consistency conditions for choice were never intended to be applied to situations involving 
menu-dependent criteria or menu-dependent information; and (2) that there has been an 
implicit understanding among revealed preference theorists that the scope of the theory must 
                                                             
14 See Dasgupta, Kumar, and Pattanaik (2000).   See Quine (1953) on methodological issues relating to the testing 
of joint hypotheses. 
15 The question may arise how we conclude that transitivity of preferences are violated.  If one believes that 
preferences are non-observable, then the violation of transitivity is to be inferred by: (i) postulating some relation 
between the agent’s preferences and the choice(s) of the agent from different opportunity sets; and (ii) asking 
whether, given the postulated relation between the agent’s preferences and his choices from opportunity sets, the 
observed choices are compatible with the requirement that preferences be transitive. 27 
 
be restricted to exclude such situations.  Whether revealed preference theorists, such as 
Samuelson (1947, 1948), Little (1949), Houthakker (1950), and Richter (1966) had in mind such 
a scope-restricted theory of revealed preference is an interesting issue in the history of 
economic thought, but it is beyond the scope of our paper.  What, however, is germane for the 
purpose of this paper is the implications, for Sen’s critique, of explicitly restricting the 
applications of internal consistence conditions, as properties of rational choice, to situations 
where neither the criteria for choice nor the information relevant for choice are menu-
dependent.  For convenience of exposition, let us focus on Chernoff’s condition.  What the 
proposed restriction of the applicability of Chernoff’s condition as a criterion of rationality of 
choice essentially does is to replace the intuitive position represented by (6.1) below by the 
intuitive position represented by (6.2): 
an agent, whose choice function violates Chernoff’s condition, is not rational    (6.1) 
  if the choice situation does not involve any menu-dependent criteria or menu- 
dependent information, then an agent, whose choice function violates Chernoff’s condition, is 
not rational.                            (6.2) 
 
Though the examples in Section 3 can be used as intuitive counterexamples against the position 
represented by (6.1), clearly they cannot be used in that fashion against the position 
represented by (6.2) since all those examples involve either menu-dependent criteria or menu-
dependent information.   Does this in any way work against the substance of Sen’s argument 
that, without referring to an agent’s objectives and concerns, one cannot treat  the internal 
consistency conditions for choice, on their own, as tests of the rationality of the agent’s 
choices?  We do not think so.  Suppose we take position (6.2) and we find that the agent’s 
choices violate Chernoff’s condition.  Then we cannot say anything about the rationality of the 
agent’s choices unless we commit ourselves to a position about whether the agent’s choice 
situation involves menu-dependent criteria or menu-dependent information relevant for the 
agent, and, of course, we cannot take a position about whether the agent’s choice situation 
involves menu-dependent criteria or menu-dependent information without considering what 28 
 
the agent’s goals/objectives/ concerns may be.  We are then back to the core of Sen’s 
argument, namely, that without considering the objectives and concerns of the agent, one 
cannot say much about the rationality of the agent’s choices exclusively on the basis of internal 
consistency conditions.   
We have considered above the proposal to restrict the application of internal 
consistency conditions for choice, when they are interpreted as conditions of rationality.  
Exactly similar reasoning can, however, be given if, interpreting the internal consistency 
conditions as empirically testable hypotheses, we replace hypothesis (6.3) below by hypothesis 
(6.4): 
the agent’s choice behavior satisfies Chernoff’s conditions        (6.3) 
if the choice situation does not involve menu-dependent criteria or menu-dependent 
information, then the agent’s choice behavior satisfies Chernoff’s condition.            (6.4) 
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we have formulated a more general framework than those suggested in the 
literature to accommodate the counter-examples due to Luce and Raiffa and Sen.  We have also 
argued that, though our formulation, as well as those in the existing literature, is of interest for 
certain purposes, it does not in any way affect either the validity or the conceptual impact of 
Sen’s contention that the reasonableness of internal consistency conditions as conditions for 
rational choice cannot be judged without going into the agent’s motives and objectives.  Our 
conclusion here differs significantly from the position taken by Bossert and Suzumura (2009a, b) 
vis-à-vis Sen’s analysis in their important recent contribution.   
 We believe that Sen’s basic point has important implications for the classical economic 
theory of rational choice.  The classical economic theory of rational choice has focused almost 
exclusively on structural rationality as distinct from goal rationality.  Structural rationality itself, 
however, embodies the notion of coherent choice, given the agent’s goals and concerns. It is, 
therefore, not possible to conclude whether or not the agent satisfies structural rationality 
simply on the basis of our observations of the agent’s choice behavior without referring to the 29 
 
concerns of the agent.  Choice behavior that may appear incoherent for some set of concerns, 
may be perfectly coherent for another set of concerns.  In one sense, it is not even possible to 
construct a formal model of rational choice without introducing some presupposition, whether 
explicit or implicit, about the agent’s concerns. In formal models of rational choice, the 
specification of the options captures our assumption, often implicit, regarding the concerns of 
the agent.  The examples of menu-dependent criteria and information given by Luce and Raiffa 
and Sen are important reminders that, when, in the framework of our formal model, the 
agent’s choices violate internal consistency conditions, such violation cannot be taken as a 
definite indication of structurally incoherent choice; instead, it may be simply due to the fact 
that the specifications of options in our formal model does not capture certain concerns that 
the agent has.  This, of course, raises the question whether an outside observer, say, an 
economist, observing an agent’s choice behavior, can ever be certain whether, given the goals 
of the agent, he is behaving in an incoherent fashion.  The answer to this question would seem 
to be in the negative for the following reason.  In general, there can be an infinite number of 
different goals and concerns guiding the agent’s choices.  No matter how carefully the 
economist may specify the options, there will still remain the possibility that his specification of 
the options does not capture some concerns of the agent and the seeming incoherence is due 
to that.  The best that the economist can say is that, if the information that he has about the 
agent’s concerns and that he has put into his conception of an option is correct and complete, 
then the agent’s choice behavior is incoherent.  This tentative position would seem to be more 
justifiable than the position that internal inconsistency of the agent’s observed choice behavior 
(choice being seen in terms of the observer’s conception of the agent’s “options”) is a 
conclusive indicator of “irrationality”, as well as the position that, if the observed choice 
behavior of the agent violates internal consistency, then there must be some concerns of the 
agent that are not captured by the specification of the options, and the internal inconsistency 
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Appendix 
Proof of Proposition 4.1.  Let <     > be the initial description of the agent, and, given 
   for every      ,  let <        > be the modified description satisfying (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3). 
(i) 
Chernoff’s condition.  Suppose the choice function   satisfies Chernoff’s condition.  Let 
            and             be such that                 and                       
         .  We need to show that               .  From the definition of      there exists      , 
such that                            .  Since         , it must be the case that, for some 
      with      ,                          .  Since           , there must be            
such that                   and                  .  Note that                                .  
It must be true that           and          .  Since   satisfies Chernoff’s condition, from 
     , and           and          , we must have          .  Therefore, by the definition of 
   , we obtain                             .   
The weak axiom of revealed preference. Suppose the choice function   satisfies the 
weak axiom of revealed preference.  Let             and             be such that         
         and              .  We need to show not(              and              ).  From the 
definition of       there must be some        , such that                            and 
                          .  Since                 , there must be              such that 
                             and                             .  Suppose              , 
and suppose to the contrary that               and              .  Then, we must have         , 
                     . This contradicts our assumption that the choice function   satisfies 33 
 
the weak axiom of revealed preference.  Therefore, not(              and              ) holds, 
showing that the choice function     satisfies the weak axiom of revealed preference.   
The congruence axiom and rationalizability in terms of an ordering.  It is fairly easy to 
see that, when the choice function   is rationalizable in terms of an ordering, the choice 
function     must be rationalizable in terms of an ordering as well.  Given that the congruence 
axiom for   is logically equivalent to rationalizability of   in terms of an ordering, and that the 
congruence axiom for     is logically equivalent to rationalizability of     in terms of an ordering, 
it follows that if   satisfies the congruence axiom, then     satisfies the congruence axiom.   
(ii) Since the congruence axiom and rationalizability in terms of an ordering are logically 
equivalent and both these properties are strictly stronger than the weak axiom of revealed 
preference, as well as Chernoff’s condition, it will be enough if we show that    satisfies the 
congruence axiom when     is trivial for all       .  Suppose, for all           is trivial but    
violates the congruence axiom.  We shall show a contradiction.  Since, by our assumption,    
violates the congruence axiom,  
there exist a positive integer    menus                 , and                  , such 
that, for all                  ,             ); for all                            and  
                         .                   (A.1)   
In what follows, we shall treat such             and             as fixed.  Given the 
construction of <        >, for every                   , there exists a unique       , such 
that 
                                               (A.2) 
and 
  for all           there exists a unique         such that                 .     (A.3) 
By (A.1), for all               ,             and                 Then, by (A.3), for every 
             , there exists  a unique        , such that                      , and there 34 
 
exists a unique            , such that                           ).  In that case, for every 
                we must have            and, further, given that every    is trivial for every 
     , we must have          .  Since           for all              , we have           
and, hence,            .  This however generates a contradiction, given that, by (A.1), 
             and                            
(iii)   An example will suffice to prove Proposition 4.1 (iii).  Let the initial description 
<     > be such that                                   where                
                                 and                and                      
                             and                Assume that the exogenously given set, 
        , of equivalence relations is given by the following: 
                                                                                 
and               
It is clear that   violates Chernoff’s condition, and, for all          is non-trivial. Given 
        , as specified above, consider the new description <         > of the agent that 
satisfies conditions (4.1), (4.2), and (4.3).   Clearly,                                           
                                            ;                      , where     
                                     ,                                        , 
                                       ,                                        , and 
                                                  ; and  
                                                                 ,       = 
                                   , and                                    It can be 
easily checked that    is rationalizable by the following ordering   over    (  and  , 
respectively, denote the symmetric and asymmetric factors of  ): 
                                                                               
          . 
Since    satisfies rationalizability in terms of an ordering, it clearly satisfies all the other 
properties introduced in Definition 2.1.   • 